Approved For Release 2003/04/29: CIA-RDP84-00780R005900020026-0

DD/M&S Registry File OFM6

Chief, Historical Staff

Walt:

Topic #8 is a puzzling item--I don't quite see it. An additional topic which can be added for the future is CIA's role in Watergate and other related events.

> 151 Horold /j: Harold L. Brownman

> > 4/8/74

Distribution:

Orig - Addse w/att.

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DD/MGS/HLBrownman:jmh (8 April 1974)

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TO Attachment: M&S 74-1204, dtd 3 April 1974, S&B\$\$688: Members of the History Staff from Chief, HS, Subject - Discussion of future history topics

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3 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

TO: Members of the History Staff

I choose to consider the component phase of the history program as safely behind us. There will continue to be remnants of this program, and my position is that we will continue to accept submissions from the components. I will make the decision as to whether any further work is to be done. If any work is to be done, it will consist entirely of technical editing and typing, and logging into the CIA history system.

Our current program, as approved by the Management Committee, has undergone one change. The history of Richard Helms as DCI has been deleted, and no further work will be undertaken on this project at this time.

Now, - it is high time we looked toward the future. There are a number of current and immanent topics which we need to look at, and the following list is off the top of my head. I submit it to you for your comments, for your additions and deletions:

Of primary policy concern is probably the Agency's role in support of the SAL Talks, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks, the Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CESC), and general disarmament. We should begin now to identify the offices and the officers most directly concerned with these important topics and to examine the state of their files as to whether they are keeping an adequate and comprehensive record of historical documents.

The second subject is the Agency's role in international narcotics traffic. Here I plan to consult with who is in charge of NARCOG, to see what records ne is keeping

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and what plans he may have for maintaining a library which will lend itself to a future historical treatment.

Third is the Agency's role in monitoring international terrorism. I shall consult with of the Operations Staff along the lines of my consultation as noted in topic two above.

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Fourth, the role of the Agency in providing support to the administration in the form of economic intelligence has grown recently and will probably continue to grow. Someone should sit down with Maurice Ernst at the earliest moment to review the subject with him to make sure that he is maintaining adequate files for a future history of this subject.

Fifth is the role of the Agency in the international energy crisis, which is much older than the Arab embargo on oil shipments or the gasoline shortage, and is a topic which will be with us for the foreseeable future. There are two principal sources of information on this subject. One is James Critchfield, with whom I have already conducted exploratory talks. The second is on the analytical side of the house, particularly in OER and old ONE, where we will want to make sure that the records of the analyses and the deliberations have been preserved in a useable form.

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The sixth topic is one which is delicate, which is not new, and which seems to have been overlooked either deliberately or accidentally. It is the story of the Agency's involvement with _____. The only feasible approach to this subject is to talk to Jim Angleton and I shall undertake this in due course.

The seventh topic which comes to mind is the whole subject of liaison with foreign intelligence services. This cuts across the board as far as the Agency is concerned, because there has been and will continue to be liaison on operational matters, on purely support matters, and on the exchange of substantive views. My own conviction is that this has been conducted more for the sake of form than substance, but I think it is time that someone sit down

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with the various pieces of evidence which we have to see if this is indeed suitable for a chapter in the history of the major Agency activities.

The eighth topic which, again, is not new, but one which has not received particular emphasis until quite recently, is the subject of the cost of the national intelligence effort as opposed to the budget for the Central Intelligence Agency as such. Here a prime source of information would be John Clarke Reaching into the past, John Bross could sned some light on this, but obviously it is a subject which is of increasing concern to the top levels of the Agency and is one which should be dealt with in due course.

Nine, although we do not yet have a responsible history of the covert cold war, we should begin to think now of the ending of this phase of Agency operations. We have come a long way from the time.

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The person responsible for writing the history of covert cold war should probably bear in mind that he will be asked to bring this to an orderly end, and to prepare a history as to how we greatly diminished the amount of effort devoted to this activity.

The tenth subject again is not a new one, but one which has not been dealt with and concerns the general subject of defectors. I do not mean the entire activities

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would be to Jim Angleton of the CI Staff and I intend to

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make this approach in due course. A second approach would be to Chief, SB Division or other area division chiefs. A final source of information would be from the analytical side of the house, where the product from these unique and informative sources became part of the overall information which was evaluated in making estimates and analyses.

The following topics, 11-14, are more concerned with the managerial functions of the Agency than with substance. The eleventh topic which I am considering is the history of the transition from the former Board of National Estimates and the Office of National Estimates to the present concept of the National Intelligence Officers as a means of managing the process of making estimates and seeing that they reach the correct consumers. This history should consider the interests of the consumers almost as much as it will the interests of those who produced the estimates, and the first task should be to insure that the records covering the dissolution of ONE and the establishment of NIO are available and adequate to the task.

Topic number 12 is concerned with the introduction of modern management techniques into the Central Intelligence Agency. This includes management by objectives, the so-called post-auditing of an operation and the like. What I have in mind is a history of the origins of such managerial concepts, whether in the academy or industry, their introduction into the United States Government, and their incorporation by the CIA with specific applications to our particular ways of doing business. Also included would be the whole concept of programming, planning, and budgeting which probably came in with McNamara and his whiz kids. Substantively, this is not an exciting topic, but it is one which has come to bear more and more weight on our day to day operations, and is one which should be examined to make sure that the records are equal to the task.

Topic 13 is concerned with what I choose to call the image of CIA. This has been an obsession on the part of top officials for as long as I can remember, and involves the activities of the Assistant to the Director, from Grogan down to our present day, Angus Thuermer, the Director and Deputy Director relations with members of the Washington

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Press Corps, and the publication of favorable and unfavorable books, and the Agency's efforts to manage or control them. Most recently the image of the CIA has been wrapped up in the Watergate complex. This probably will be the best starting point, and in this case, the Inspector General has all the relevant documents (one hopes), and is in the final stages of completing his report. At that time, by direction of the DCI, the entire file will be turned over to the history staff, and it will behoove us to look at this material as well as the press reactions and treatments of such material, and to compile an honest history of the Agency's involvement with Watergate and the public interpretation of that involvement.

The final topic, number 14, concerns the formal introduction of the Intelligence Community Staff as an evolution from the beginnings when the DCI had a deputy for coordination, through the institution of the National Intelligence Programs Evaluations Staff under John Bross, as set up by John A. McCone, to the present ICS under the direction of General Graham. This history would concern itself with the beginnings of the intelligence community, not only as embodied in the United States Intelligence Board, but in the whole committee and subcommittee structure and supporting bodies, but also the beginnings of the intelligence community as a budgetary function and the various instances of cooperation or lack of cooperation among the members of the intelligence community. One striking example which comes to mind is the wrangle over the National Reconnaissance Program.

Obviously one cannot attach equal weight to the subjects which I have outlined above. Some of them may qualify as major activities of the Agency or an intelligence community; some may not. Moreover, I do not pretend that this is a comprehensive or all-inclusive list; therefore, I earnestly solicit you to offer your comments on whether you think the subjects I have outlined do qualify for historical treatment. I would also value your comments as to those which you think do not qualify for treatment, and I would like your substantive comments on each of the topics which you see fit to comment on, and would welcome your suggestions as to added topics. A key factor in each of these topics will be the

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location and identification of files, and the location and identification of an appropriate writer.

The main thrust of this memorandum is to ensure that we are participating in the history of the Agency at the beginning of activities and not waiting until they are completed. Obviously, new topics will arise from time to time, and we shall need to be alert to them so that we can maintain a monitoring role over the files and the people who are most closely involved.

WALTER ELDER Chief, CIA History Staff 25X1